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as research continues to underscore the 
fallibility of forensic science, the judge’s role 
as gatekeeper is more important than ever.
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THIS YEAR MARKS THE 25TH ANNIVER-
SARY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION IN DAUBERT V. MERRELL DOW 
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., which funda-
mentally reshaped how judges evaluate 
scientific and expert evidence.1 This volume 
of Judicature, with three wonderful contri-
butions by Jay Koehler, Pate Skene, and 
an expert team led by William Thompson, 
comes at an ideal time to reconsider how 
successful the modern judicial approach to 
expert evidence has been. That approach is 
now reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 
702, revised in 2000 to comport with 
the Daubert ruling, and in state judi-
cial rulings and state rules of evidence, 
which have followed suit in most states.2
The Supreme Court’s Daubert ruling 
coincided with a surge in scientific 
research relevant to criminal cases, 
including the development of modern 
DNA testing that both exonerated 
hundreds of individuals and provided 
more accurate evidence of guilt. Since 
then, leading scientific commissions 
have pointed out real shortcomings in 
the use of forensic evidence in the court-
room. They also have noted that judges 
have largely abdicated their responsibil-
ity as gatekeepers.3 Moreover, we have 
learned that those same DNA exoner-
ations are not a one-sided triumph of 
modern forensic science, because over 
half of those innocent people were orig-
inally convicted by flawed, overstated, 
and unreliable forensics.4 A flood of scan-
dals have led to audits of thousands of 
state and federal cases, lab closures, and 
review commissions. In response to 
such concerns, the Judicial Conference 
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 
has solicited comments on potential 
revisions to Rule 702 addressing foren-
sic expert testimony.5
In this volume, William Thompson 
and his coauthors describe how we are 
undergoing a sea change in forensics, 
particularly in the pattern disciplines. 
This is a time of crisis but also a time 
of great promise in forensic science. The 
terminology used to express conclusions, 
error-rate statistics, and the funda-
mental conception of what experts are 
doing are all in flux. Traditional disci-
plines like latent fingerprinting, which 
has been done the same way for over a 
hundred years, are on the cusp of a trans-
formation. In that field, analysts would 
typically state without qualification 
that a print was a “match” and came 
from the defendant, and that there was 
a zero probability of an error. Now it is 
well understood that no human exper-
tise is immune from error, any subjective 
comparison is inherently probabilistic, 
and expertise depends on the proficiency 
of the person doing the analysis. 
Today, as Thompson and colleagues 
describe, forensic expert conclusions are 
becoming more appropriately cautious 
in many disciplines. The 2016 White 
House Presidential Council of Advisers 
on Science and Technology (PCAST) 
report emphasized the need to validate 
forensics, including by studying error 
rates and informing jurors of those error 
rates.6 The 2017 American Association 
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS 
report), which Thompson co-authored, 
recommended such changes as well and 
made more detailed recommendations 
concerning the language to be used in 
latent fingerprinting.7 Indeed, forensic 
conclusions may soon be quantitative; 
Thompson describes the move to incor-
porate statistics in forensics.  Researchers 
are hard at work on methods to use algo-
rithms to supplement or even supplant 
the subjective judgment of individual 
forensic analysts. 
Next, Jay Koehler focuses on reliabil-
ity: What are the error rates for forensics? 
As Koehler notes, many people assume 
that forensics are nearly infallible. If 
jurors think that forensic experts are 
infallible but judges know they are not, 
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then what is the obligation of a judge to 
ensure that the jury is informed about 
the limitations of the science?
Rule 702 states that an expert may 
testify if using “reliable principles and 
methods,” which are “reliably applied” to 
the facts.8 Or as the Advisory Committee 
states, judges shall “exclude unreliable 
expert testimony.”9  Koehler is right that 
now is the time to ask whether the “reli-
ability rule” adopted in Daubert and in 
Rule 702 is being appropriately used by 
the judiciary. 
Koehler also highlights the (some-
times quite aggressive) responses to 
the PCAST report. Some members of 
government agencies and professional 
organizations called the report unfounded 
and biased for suggesting that a range of 
forensic disciplines lack empirically vali-
dated reliability. They suggest there is 
no problem with continuing to rely on 
an expert’s experience and subjective 
professional judgment. 
In response, Koehler emphasizes 
judges should not admit evidence just 
because an expert claims to have experi-
ence. Judges should not admit evidence 
just because other judges have done 
so for a long time. Judges should not 
admit evidence just because experts take 
(extremely unrealistic and easy) profi-
ciency tests. Experts should have to show 
that their work is reliable and that they 
are truly proficient. That is, after all, 
what Rule 702 demands. The problem, 
Koehler concludes, is not with the text 
of the rule, but its laissez-faire applica-
tion by judges.
Finally, Pate Skene further explores 
what the proper role of judges is at a 
time when empirical evidence to support 
so many forensics can be mixed or lack-
ing. Skene describes how judges have 
themselves raised real questions about 
the reliability of commonly used forensic 
techniques. Skene focuses on the prob-
lem that for many forensic techniques, 
well-designed empirical studies have not 
yet been conducted to validate the reli-
ability of the techniques. The PCAST 
report emphasized as much.
Turning back to jurors, Skene high-
lights how important it is for judges not 
to just exercise their role as gatekeeper, 
but also to ensure that when forensic 
evidence is admitted, jurors hear about 
its limitations. Jurors are highly recep-
tive to information about error rates 
in forensic techniques and informa-
tion about the proficiency of particular 
forensic analysts, as Greg Mitchell and 
I have shown in several studies.10 Skene 
suggests that such information may be 
conveyed by jury instructions or by addi-
tional experts who can explain error rates 
or reliability concerns to the jury. Skene 
also suggests that the need for judicial 
intervention to educate jurors will be 
greatest when there is less known about 
the reliability of a forensic technique.  
Twenty-five years after Daubert, the 
reliability revolution is still nascent. In 
an era of plea bargaining and the vanish-
ing criminal trial, it is all the more 
important that judges safeguard reliabil-
ity, since it will be the rare occasion when 
a fact-finder can scrutinize reliability in 
the courtroom. It is equally important 
that crime labs themselves incorporate 
blind proficiency and error manage-
ment as part of routine quality control. 
In response to quite complex problems, 
these thought-provoking contributions 
from Koehler, Thompson, and Skene set 
out a clear agenda to bring reliability 
back into our criminal courtrooms.
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